Fear of Flying
Globalization, Security, and Terrorism
RICHARD W. BLOOM

The author is Assistant Vice President, Academics, Embry- Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, Arizona, and Chair of the TRB Aviation Security and Emergency Management Committee.

G lobalization, security, and terrorism are words often invoked by experts in news- papers, on television, and in the blog- osphere, tweeted via the latest versions of social networking, and even occasionally pro- nounced in person. As if at the mercy of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass—whose words meant whatever he chose them to mean—each of these words is applied similarly and differently by the same and different people, so that confusion results. Before examining how globalization has affected, is affecting, and will affect aviation security—especially in the context of terrorism—the first step is to clear
the verbal air.

Globalization
What is globalization, and when did it begin? The word appears in dictionaries in the mid-1940s,

although some treat the word as newly coined. Most definitions point to the increasing degree by which anyone can be affected by anyone else who is some- where else in the world. Most definitions also note the increasing interconnectivity among people. Any- thing and anyone may be involved—from war, poli- tics, and sociocultural matters, to health, wealth, and the pursuit of happiness.
Different groups of scholars have identified dif- ferent starting points for globalization. Some choose 1989, with the end of the Cold War and the increase of what is termed postindustrial capitalism. Others favor the 1950s, with the decolonization of the Euro- pean empires in Africa and Asia; some point to 1492, with the rise of European sea exploration and trade; and yet others go back past the expansion of Islam in the 7th through 9th centuries to Alexander the Great in the late 4th century BC.

Security
Sometimes security is considered a state of mind, signifying that someone feels safe from intentional harm; safety then becomes freedom from uninten- tional harm. Security may be an objective conse- quence—someone is safe from intentional harm— and may imply a meaning not accurate in the real world—that someone can be completely safe from intentional harm. Security may refer as well to what is done to achieve any of those goals—for example, employing behavioral recognition and verbal inter- rogation, explosives detection, biometrics, profiling,

data mining algorithms, and the old standby, door locks.
An immediate conclusion is that experts may be arguing about different kinds of security. Applied research about globalization’s effects on the mean- ings, perceptions, and expectations of security is all over the board.

Terrorism
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is an old canard that must be put to rest. The statement is true to the extent that one man’s canni- bal is another man’s gourmand. The behaviors occur regardless of what they are called, but preventing these behaviors requires action.
Some experts state that terrorism involves threat- ening, injuring, or killing innocent people; some retort that no one is innocent. Other experts state that terrorism is violence to further political or reli- gious beliefs. Yet apprehended and incarcerated ter- rorists may point to lifestyle choice, group influence and pressure, or sincere mystification. Most experts agree that the victims of terrorism are not only those who are threatened, injured, or killed, but those who are direct survivors or indirect observers—especially through mass media and telecommunications.
If terrorism is successful, these victims are more likely to think, feel, and act in the manner desired by terrorist planners. If no one finds out about terror- ism, it does not work. One conclusion may be that counterterrorism should entail less screening of peo- ple and things and more prevention or censorship of the news. The main issue then becomes freedom of life versus freedom of speech without life. 

Finding Terrorists
All methods of finding terrorists include collecting and analyzing information about people, develop- ing a valid link between the information and the probability that a person directly or indirectly will engage in or support terrorism, and then acting to prevent or minimize terrorism in specific cases. The kinds of information collected and analyzed include voice intercepts, relayed discussions, and observa- tions, as well as past travel behaviors, known asso- ciates, facial expressions, and choice of clothing.
The biggest problem is developing valid links between information and predicted behavior. Pre- dictions of human behavior—for example, of vio- lence—are extremely difficult. This should not be surprising; human social behavior is unknowable— although this explanation may not fare well after a terrorist event.

Challenges
Challenges to linking information to predicted behavior include the following:
1. The same information may mean something different in different contexts, especially when psy- chological triggers are added or withheld.
2. Depending on the parameters, many people may change from terrorism-inclined to not inclined and back again, and from being inclined or not inclined in different ways.
3. Most people have less than complete awareness about their own behaviors, thoughts, feelings, moti- vations, and inclinations, even if they desire to be fully aware or to share this awareness during an inter- view or interrogation.
4. Experts often are confounded by the paradox that the most sophisticated terrorists will not look like terrorists, yet most people do not look like ter- rorists.
5. The greatest majority of people are extremely unlikely to engage in terrorism, except in the most extreme situations; therefore, a system for finding terrorists must be extremely accurate, or hordes of nonterrorists will be identified and treated as terror- ists with noxious, self-induced security, economic, and political consequences for commercial aviation.

6. Without high accuracy in detecting a terrorist, certain nonterrorists may become terrorists because of their treatment by security authorities who wrongly identify them as terrorism-inclined.
7. Some terrorists inevitably will be treated as nonterrorists in a less-than-perfect security system, and successful terrorism will result.
Because of points 4 through 7, some experts sup- port random screening of air passengers—or a mod- ification of random screening—even if those pulled out for secondary screening include a 4-year-old child or a 90-year-old grandmother, who may have something dangerous planted on them.
8. A commonly accepted terrorist indicator, stress, is not all that useful. Stresses arise from many reasons not related to terrorism—such as trying to avoid missing a flight; moreover, someone about to engage in terrorism who believes it is God’s will or the key to some other good may not appear stressed, but calm, tranquil, and even blissful.
9. The typical explanations for terrorism—such as ethnic, sectarian, tribal, economic, and personal grievances—may be superficial, offering few insights into the underlying psychology.
10. All experts depend on combinations of faith, intuition, logic, authority, observation, and experi- mentation to link information to predicted behavior, although all of these approaches have flaws.
11. A contemporary perspective holds that a per- son’s individual identity, mind, nature, personality, and concepts of causality, space, and time may be lan- guage fictions that have practical value in describing self and reality but may not actually exist. Yet if this is the case, the foundation for the screening criteria developed by experts is tenuous.

A U.S. Customs and Border Protection canine officer checks arriving luggage. Aviation security relies on a range of detection measures, from trained dogs to X-rays.

Finding Explosives and Weaponry

Experts rely on a variety of technologies to identify the physical characteristics of explosives and other weaponry intended for terrorism. Bulk forms and trace amounts of proscribed materiel can be detected and identified.
An example that highlights the main issues has been in the news as much for prurient interest as for security—the full-body scanner. The technology detects bulk forms of explosives and other weaponry via electromagnetic radiation, usually millimeter waves or X-rays. The radiation reflected from an indi- vidual’s body is analyzed via computerized algo- rithms to depict differential densities of the body and objects that may be in or under clothing. Aviation security is supported when some of these objects prove to be explosives or other weaponry, or when the technology deters bringing these items into an 24 airport.

Technology Problems
Several problems arise; accuracy is the first. Tech- nologies are not 100 percent accurate when tested realistically in a laboratory, tested in field conditions, or employed operationally. Accuracy is further affected by human performance factors, such as low motivation, fatigue, distractions, and the application of strategies for interpreting technical data. Many advocates of the technology concede that low-den- sity items of interest—constituted of liquid, powder, or thin plastic, for example—may go undetected, as will items hidden between folds of body fat and within body orifices.
Second, a sophisticated terrorist entity has the intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capa- bilities to learn what the technology does and how. Planning then can focus on how to beat the system, go around it, target another aspect of the aviation environment, or choose another transportation mode or some other target. Most terrorists do not harbor aviation fetishes or have a burning desire to disregard
The controversial full-body scanner is designed to detect explosives or other weaponry. Problems such as accuracy, cost, and possibility of malfunction must be addressed when relying on technology for aviation security.

Layers of Security
In addition to the goals of finding terrorists, explo- sives, and weapons, five other important issues affect aviation security and terrorism in an era of globalization.

Intelligence Operations
Intelligence operations are necessary to find, appre- hend, interrogate, and—under legal and ethical rules of engagement and adjudication—incarcerate or terminate terrorists before they can attack. The information from these operations needs to be transmitted continuously and securely to aviation- related authorities, who then must modify policies, plans, programs, and moment-by-moment layers of security. With globalization, layers of security must protect against ever-changing threats inter- acting with ever-changing vulnerabilities leading to ever-changing risks.

Psychological Factors
Industrial and organizational psychology play a role. For example, the morale and performance of aviation security personnel who screen at checkpoints would improve with higher pay, better training, a profes- sional culture bordering on elitism, more positive marketing of security careers, scientifically validated professional training dealing with the detection of low-probability events, and more respect.
Too many leaders throughout the intelligence, security, law enforcement, and political communities, for example, cultivate a can-do attitude that may lead to turf battles and interpersonal conflicts. The dynamics of looking for evil may lead to committing

Analysts monitor the transportation network at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Operations Center, which facilitates communication between TSA, government agencies, and law enforcement and security agencies. Intelligence operations and communication are part of a multilayered approach to security.

In an international security cooperative exercise between the United States and Cameroon, a U.S. Navy lieutenant serves as a mock captive for the Cameroon Navy’s Rapid Intervention Battalion team at Douala Naval Base.

evil—such as illegal acts and atrocities—to the detri- ment of those who are being protected. Some of these dynamics include justifying unethical conduct as serving moral purposes, minimizing personal

responsibility for immorality, relabeling and misper- ceiving unethical and immoral consequences, and dehumanizing and blaming human targets. A signif- icant body of research suggests that globalization is

exposing people to disinhibiting stimuli, rendering terrorism and inappropriate counterterrorism more likely.


Public Relations
All foreign policy tools—military, diplomatic, economic, social, cul- tural, and humanitarian—should be used to improve international perceptions of the United States, so that fewer people engage in or support terrorism. With globalization, an increasing number of information sources compete for attention, so that actual threats may be ignored or discounted.
Many people, at least within the United States, expect 100 per- cent safety and security. Many will not tolerate casualties or ter- rorist attempts and seem to expect a perfect imperviousness to threats. Despite the low frequency and small objective conse- quences of previous terrorism, the subjective psychological con- sequences have been much larger and longer-lasting. This psychology makes the United States a lucrative target and increases the probability of terrorist success—because objective success and

objective failure both qualify as subjective success.
A more mature perspective on reality, the meaning of life, and the nature of risk is needed. Globalization may help by facilitat- ing an understanding that significant risk is omnipresent, even as
it varies from place to place and moment to moment.

Psychological Warfare
Terrorism is ultimately psychological, and the war against terrorism, a specific warfare technique, is actually a global psychological war. The conflict is with ever-changing groupings of people who have used and are willing to use extraordinary violence to create a world that toler- ates certain ways of living but not others.
Antiterrorism and counterterrorism may identify, apprehend, incarcerate, and terminate many terrorists but may create as many—if not more—terrorists, because of the way these actions are communicated. Aviation security is only a part of the global psychological war, in which the victors and vanquished may not be people, but the ideas they carry.